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Fix It! Constructing a
Recommendation to the Ocean
Commission for the Future
of Fisheries
Kristen M. Fletcher*
The problem with fish illustrates some of the structural and
policy problems that the Council will be grappling with.
-Doug Hopkins, Environmental Defense. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The release of the 2001 film The Perfect Storm, telling the
story of the tragic loss of the Andrea Gail and her crew, brought
the dangers that commercial fishers face on a daily basis in front of
the American public. While the film is mostly remembered for its
cast and the enormous waves generated to simulate the "storm of
the century" that converged on New England, it also subtly showed
the economic hardships of an industry searching for a way to main-
tain itself in a time of declining fish stocks, competition with
larger, more technologically advanced vessels, and captains that
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Law School (1996); B.A., Auburn University (1993). This Article is a result of re-
search sponsored in part by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), the United States Department of Commerce under Grant Number
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1. Doug Hopkins, Program Director, Oceans Program, Environmental De-
fense, Testimony Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 1, at http://www.
oceancommission.gov/meetings/novl3 14 01/Hopkins testimony.pdf (Nov. 13,
2001) [hereinafter Hopkins Statement].
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feel the pressure to sail farther, faster, and even risk safety to
bring home the fish.
It is this U.S. fisheries regime that represents one of the great-
est challenges for the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy (Commis-
sion), created by the Oceans Act of 2000, which has been directed
to review U.S. practices relating to its oceans and coasts and make
recommendations for a national ocean policy. The Commission is
responsible for making recommendations on the U.S. fisheries
management regime, which poses socioeconomic, ecological, gov-
ernance, and management issues. Additionally, the Commission is
responsible for reviewing such issues as nonliving marine re-
sources, marine transportation, and coastal development, to name
a few. Though it underwent considerable modification in 1996, it
is likely facing significant changes in the next few years. With the
eyes of the fishing, environmental, and private sectors focused on
the Commission to "fix" fisheries management, its analysis of one
of the nation's most captivating but also challenging professions
may also determine its success in creating an ocean policy for the
country.
As will be discussed in Part II of this Article, the Commission
has held a series of regional public hearings to gather information
from the public on ocean and coastal resource and management
issues. At these hearings, experts have gathered to give testimony
and participate in a question and answer session with the Commis-
sioners. It is from this testimony and dialogue that the Commis-
sion will develop its recommendations to Congress. Fisheries
issues have arisen in every region, showing the importance of both
commercial and recreational fisheries to every region of the coun-
try and the national scope of the problems.
Eventually, through the testimony offered to the Commission,
and letters from witnesses providing answers to follow-up ques-
tions from the Commissioners, themes emerged showing the
strengths and weaknesses of the fisheries management scheme
and recommended solutions to environmental, economic, and legal
problems. Amendment to the primary federal fisheries statute, the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
(Magnuson Act), looms as a top priority. In addition, the issues
raised relating to the regional fishery management councils - the
regional management scheme set up by the Magnuson Act -
threaten to further divide the already polarized stakeholders.
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Lastly, the lack of a coordinated federal oceans policy plagues the
management regime and leaves fish stocks, the marine habitat,
and the recreational and commercial fishing industries vulnerable
to damage from non-fishing related activities.
This Article offers highlights from the testimony offered to the
Commission on fisheries issues in the United States and analyzes
the effectiveness of several proposed solutions. Part II of this Arti-
cle provides background information on the Magnuson Act, includ-
ing its mandate, implementation, and shortcomings over the last
two decades, as well as information on the Commission, including
its creation and mandate from Congress. The next three parts of
this Article present the main themes from public testimony at the
first six regional meetings of the Commission. Specifically, Part III
analyzes the suggestions for amendments to the Magnuson Act, in-
cluding adding a conservation mandate, mandating the use of
ecosystem management, and codifying existing management prac-
tices. Part IV provides analysis of the current structure of the re-
gional fisheries management councils and the proposals for
changing that structure. Part V analyzes the proposed changes to
federal agency organization and research funding and priorities.
Finally, this Article concludes with a wish list of proposed solu-
tions that the Commission might consider in order to "fix" the U.S.
fisheries management regime.
II. U.S. FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AND THE COMMISSION
A. An Introduction to U.S. Fisheries Law
The Magnuson Act,2 enacted in 1976 as the primary statute
for U.S. fisheries, had two original purposes. First, spurred by re-
ports of foreign ships depleting stocks of fish off the U.S. coast,
Congress created a 200-mile exclusive fishing zone called the fish-
ery conservation zone, which effectively eliminated foreign fishing
in a matter of a few years.3 In 1993, the Reagan administration
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1803-1883 (2000) (originally enacted as the Fisheries Conser-
vation and Management Act of 1976, ch. 38, § 1801, 90 Stat. 331; amended as the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Dec. 22, 1980, 94 Stat.
3300; amended as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act, Sept. 30, 1996, ch. 38, § 1801, 110 Stat. 3009) [hereinafter Magnuson Act].
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1811. The Act contains special provisions for highly migratory
species that migrate out of the fishery conservation zone (now the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone) into international or other nations' waters. Id. § 1812.
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adopted a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), claiming sover-
eign rights over resources and economic uses. 4 In 1989, foreign
catches in the U.S. EEZ were approximately one percent of the
1976 amount, while commercial domestic landings doubled.5 Con-
gress assumed that the overfishing occurring in U.S. waters was
primarily a result of an abundance of foreign vessels and that the
exclusion of these vessels would clear the way for increased long-
term harvest by U.S. fishing vessels.
Second, with development and advancement of the U.S. fish-
ing industry in mind, the Magnuson Act set up a regional manage-
ment scheme based on eight "regional fishery management
councils" (Councils) that were given the authority to manage fish-
eries through the creation of fisheries management plans (FMPs)
and to comment on activities affecting the fishery. 6 The Councils
were responsible for meeting the larger goal of preventing overfish-
ing while still achieving optimum yields from each fishery.7 Coun-
cils met these goals through various management techniques
including setting total allowable catch, size limitations, seasonal
closures, gear restrictions, and other limited entry techniques." An
FMP developed by the Councils must contain the measures "neces-
sary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the
fishery to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks, and to
protect, restore, and promote the long-term health and stability of
the fishery."9 In addition, FMPs must comply with the ten na-
tional standards specified in the statute. Measures must: (1) be
based on the best scientific information available; (2) be fair and
equitable to all fishers; (3) consider efficiency; (4) allow for varia-
tions in fisheries resources and catches; (5) minimize costs; (6)
4. Proclamation No. 5030, I PuB. PAPERS 380 (Mar. 10, 1983).
5. JOHN P. WISE, FEDERAL CONSERVATION & MANAGEMENT OF MARINE Fi-
SHERIES IN THE UNITED STATES vii (2d ed. 1991).
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852-1853.
7. See id. § 1851(a)(1). Optimum yield is that which provides the "greatest
overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food production and rec-
reational opportunities," and is based on the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of
a fishery. Id. § 1802. MSY is the largest average catch that can be captured from a
stock under existing environmental conditions. See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, IMPROV-
ING FISH STOCK ASSESSMENTS (1998).
8. See generally Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management
and the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799 (1997) (evaluating
the techniques employed by the Councils to meet these goals).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1853 (a)(1)(A).
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minimize adverse economic impacts on fishing communities; (7)
minimize bycatch and its mortality; and (8) promote the safety of
human life at sea.10 Finally, conservation and management mea-
sures also must comply with other federal laws including the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 11 Executive Order
12,291,12 the Regulatory Flexibility Act,13 the Paperwork Reduc-
tion Act,14 the Marine Mammal Protection Act,' 5 and Executive
Order 12,612.16
It is important to note the context in which the Magnuson Act
was originally adopted.' 7 The House Report noted a growing con-
cern with over-exploitation of fish stocks, especially by foreign
fleets, and concluded that "[wihile certain constraints on domestic
entry in American fisheries are often necessary, such controls
would not be effective unless analogous controls apply to foreign
vessels fishing the same stocks."18 The report found the U.S. fleet
characterized by "old vessels which are expensive to maintain, rel-
atively inefficient, and subject to high and rapidly increasing in-
surance rates."19 After the passage of the Magnuson Act, the U.S.
fleet grew and took advantage of ample fish stocks previously over-
exploited by foreign fleets. 20
However, over the course of the next two decades, the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) began to warn of fully-exploited
or over-utilized fish stocks and that "the harvesting and processing
capacity in many U.S. fisheries far exceeds levels that are consis-
10. See id. § 1851(a)(l)-(10) (delineating the ten national standards).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994). NEPA requires a review of the environ-
mental impacts of major federal actions. Id.
12. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981). This Execu-
tive Order requires periodic publication of regulations. 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,195.
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2000). The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires that
agencies analyze effects of their regulations on small businesses. Id.
14. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1994).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000). The Marine Mammal Protection Act generally
prohibits the "taking" of marine mammals and the importation of marine mam-
mals or their products. Id.
16. See 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (Oct. 30, 1987) (providing guidelines for agencies
when drafting regulations or policies that have "federalism" implications).
17. See BILIANA CICIN-SAIN & ROBERT W. KNECHT, THE FuTURE OF U.S. OCEAN
POLICY 77-83 (2000) (describing the domestic and international context of the
Magnuson Act).
18. H.R. No. 94-445, at 31 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 603.
19. Id. at 30, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 602.
20. See WIsE, supra note 5.
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tent with sustainable fisheries."21 In 1998, the agency identified
90 out of 290 stocks as overfished (31%), with an additional 10
stocks approaching an overfished condition and the status of an
additional 544 stocks unknown.22 The effect of over-capitalization
in the U.S. fishery was evident when New England fisheries began
to show signs of severe decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 23
Since the 1960s, there has been up to an eighty percent decline in
stocks of haddock, cod, and flounder, and the federal government
was spending millions of dollars on buyback programs. 24 These
collapsing stocks also caught the attention of national and regional
environmental public interest groups who have become major play-
ers in the fisheries management regime in just over a decade. The
1996 amendments to the Magnuson Act, entitled the Sustainable
Fisheries Act (SFA), represent the last significant change to the
fisheries statute. The SFA added three national standards, focus-
ing on bycatch, economic analysis of the impact of fisheries regula-
tions on communities, and safety at sea, along with mandating the
identification and conservation of "essential fish habitat."25 The
SFA also initiated a flurry of legal actions from both the fishing
communities (claiming that regulations were having adverse eco-
nomic impacts) and the environmental community (claiming that
the bycatch and essential fish habitat provisions were not being
followed). 26 The legal actions led to fisheries management deci-
sions being made by the judiciary instead of scientists or manage-
ment experts.27 It is in this context of litigation, declining
21. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, SHARING THE FISH: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY ON
INDIVIDUAL FISHING QuOTAS 13 (1999) [hereinafter SHARING THE FISH].
22. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., 105TH CONG., REPORT ON STATUS OF FISH-
ERIES OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1998), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/
98stat.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
23. See Suzanne Iudicello et al., Putting Conservation into the Fishery Conser-
vation and Management Act: The Public Interest in Magnuson Reauthorization, 9
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 339, 346 (1996).
24. See Patrick Shavloske, The Canadian-Spanish Fishing Dispute: A Tem-
plate for Assessing Inadequacies of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea and a Clarion Call for Ratification of the New Fish Stock Treaty, 7 IND.
INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 223, 241 (1996).
25. Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. Law No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 46 U.S.C.).
26. See Kristen M. Fletcher, When Economics and Conservation Clash: Chal-
lenges to Economic Analysis in Fisheries Management, 31 E.L.R. 11168 (2001); in-
fra Part III.A.
27. Fletcher, supra note 26; infra Part III.A.
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fisheries, and increased attention to damaged fish habitat and by-
catch that the Oceans Act of 2000 was enacted, creating the Ocean
Commission and calling for a review of national ocean policies, in-
cluding fisheries.
B. Fisheries and the Ocean Commission
The Oceans Act of 2000 created the sixteen-member U.S. Com-
mission on Ocean Policy (Commission) to "make recommendations
for coordinated and comprehensive national ocean policy." 28 The
objectives of the Commission are to promote the following: (1) the
protection of life and property against natural and man-made
hazards; (2) responsible stewardship, including use of fishery re-
sources and other ocean and coastal resources; (3) protection of the
marine environment and prevention of marine pollution; (4) en-
hancement of marine-related commerce; (5) expansion of human
knowledge of the marine environment; (6) investment in and im-
provement of the capabilities, performance, use, and efficiency of
technologies for use in ocean and coastal activities; and (7) close
cooperation among all government agencies. 29 A final report for
this national ocean policy is due in June 2003.30
The first step in creating the Council involved the Senate and
House Majority and Minority Leaders nominating potential mem-
bers to the President. The President then appointed members to
the Council based upon their geographic representation and their
expertise in scientific, regulatory, economic, and environmental
ocean and coastal activities. Although President Clinton signed
the Oceans Act into law, it was the Bush administration (and Re-
publican majorities in both the Senate and House of Representa-
tives) that nominated the members.31
28. Oceans Act of 2000 § 2, 33 U.S.C. § 857-19 (2000).
29. Id.
30. Oceans Act of 2000 § 4(a). Though the original report was due to Congress
in April 2003, the Oceans Act was amended by Public Law 107-77, which extended
the date of the report to June 2003 ("The Commission [on Ocean Policy] shall pre-
sent to the Congress within eighteen months of the first meeting of the Commis-
sion its recommendations for a national ocean policy."). Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748, Title V (2001),
31. See Oceans Act of 2000 §§ 3(b)(1)-(4). The nominations were mandated as
follows: four members appointed from a list of eight individuals nominated by the
Majority Leader of the Senate in consultation with the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; four members appointed
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In order to efficiently address the myriad of issues it is con-
fronted with in reviewing U.S. ocean and coastal resources, the
Commission has established four working groups to review and an-
alyze issues within each specific area of focus and report the find-
ings to the full Commission. 32 The working groups are: (1)
Governance; (2) Investment and Implementation; (3) Research, Ed-
ucation, and Marine Operations; and (4) Stewardship. 33 While all
of the working groups will touch on fisheries issues, the Steward-
ship Working Group will assess the status of U.S. stewardship over
fisheries and other living and nonliving marine resources in
coastal, EEZ waters and the world's oceans. The Commission is
assisted by a mandated Science Advisory Panel set up to ensure
that the "scientific information considered by the Commission is
based on the best scientific information available."34
The only formal action that the Commission has taken stems
from the U.S. failure to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty. The Com-
mission adopted a formal resolution calling for the United States to
immediately accede to the United Nations Law of the Sea Conven-
tion in order to maintain its leadership role in ocean and coastal
activities.35 Beyond this resolution, the Commission spent its first
from a list of eight individuals who shall be nominated by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives in consultation with the Chairmen of the House Committees on
Resources, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Science; two members from a
list of four individuals nominated by the Minority Leader of the Senate in consul-
tation with the Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation; and two members appointed from a list of four individuals
nominated by the Minority Leader of the House in consultation with the Ranking
Members of the House Committees on Resources, Transportation and Infrastruc-
ture, and Science. Id. §§ 3(b)(2)(A)-(D).
32. For complete information on the Commission and its working groups, visit
the Commission web page: The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, at http:I/www.
oceancommission.gov (last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
33. Id.
34. Oceans Act of 2000 § 3(c)(3).
35. The resolution states:
The National Commission on Ocean Policy unanimously recommends that
the United States of America immediately accede to the United Nations
Law of the Sea Convention. Time is of the essence if the United States is
to maintain its leadership role in ocean and coastal activities. Critical
national interests are at stake and the United States can only be a full
participant in upcoming Convention activities if the country proceeds with
accession expeditiously.
U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POL'Y, UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION RES.,
at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/los-resolution.pdf (Nov. 14, 2001)
(on file with author).
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months of existence planning for and holding regional meetings.
The Oceans Act required at least six regional public meetings; the
Commission concluded its ninth regional meeting in Chicago on
September 25, 2002.36 After receiving testimony from the national
and regional public hearings, the Commissioners identified a vari-
ety of issues to be considered in the deliberation stage in the fall of
2002.3 7 This summary of issues evidences the course that the
Commission's dialogue about U.S. ocean issues is taking. Approxi-
mately one quarter of the document is dedicated to issues regard-
ing living marine resources, including fisheries.38
The testimony gathered at the public hearings evolved from a
group of invited speakers from the academic, government, private,
and nonprofit sectors who were convened on panels addressing is-
sues specific to the geographic region. The speakers were given
approximately ten to fifteen minutes to make a formal presenta-
tion, and then were engaged in a question and answer session with
the Commissioners for the remaining sixty to seventy-five min-
utes. Follow-up questions were mailed to the panelists and the
testimony and follow-up questions were made available on the
Commission's website.
This testimony and the follow-up responses will provide the
basis for the Commission's recommendations regarding changing
or maintaining the U.S. fisheries management regime. The three
main themes that emerged from this process were: (1) amending
the Magnuson Act; (2) reforming the regional fishery management
36. The regional meetings were: Southeast Regional Meeting, January 15-16,
2002 in Charleston, South Carolina; Florida and Caribbean Regional Meeting,
February 22, 2002 in St. Petersburg, Florida; Gulf of Mexico Regional Meeting,
March 7-8, 2002 in New Orleans, Louisiana; Southwest Regional Meeting, April
18-19, 2002 in Los Angeles, California; Hawaii and Pacific Islands Regional Meet-
ing, May 13-14, 2002 in Honolulu, Hawaii; Northwest Regional Meeting, June 13-
14, 2002 in Seattle, Washington; Northeast Regional Meeting, July 23-24, 2002 in
Boston, Massachusetts; Alaska Regional Meeting, August 21-22, 2002 in
Anchorage, Alaska; Great Lakes Regional Meeting, September 24-25, 2002 in Chi-
cago, Illinois. U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy: Commission Meetings, at http://
www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/welcome.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
Three other public meetings were held on November 13-14, 2001, October 30, 2002,
and November 22, 2002 in Washington, D.C. Id.
37. U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POL'Y, TOWARD A NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY: OCEAN
POLICY Topics AND RELATED ISSUEs 4 (Working Draft for Public Comment 2002),
available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/issues-document7-16-
02.pdf (July 16, 2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL OCEAN POLIC].
38. Id.
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council structure; and (3) improving the federal agency approach to
fisheries and fisheries research. We will most likely find a "fix" to
the current fisheries management crisis from these themes.
III. AMENDING THE MAGNUSON ACT
Passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act greatly expanded the role of the federal gov-
ernment in the management of marine fisheries. In your opin-
ion, has this worked?
- Follow-up question from Admiral James D. Watkins
after a Gulf of Mexico Regional Council meeting. 39
It depends on your definition of "worked."
- Answer from Larry Simpson, Executive Director, Gulf
States Marine Fisheries Commission.40
As noted earlier, the Magnuson Act successfully reached its
original goals of expelling foreign fishing boats from a 200-mile
U.S. fishing zone and the establishment of eight regional fishery
management councils whose decisions, more than two decades af-
ter their creation, are still guiding the domestic harvest of wild
fisheries. Clearly, adoption of the Magnuson Act was a pivotal step
in the domestic management of living marine resources. Even crit-
ics of the statute acknowledge that it ushered in the ideal that
"new management systems had to be created to protect and en-
hance the economic and social benefits derived from commercial
and recreational fishing."41 As noted by the Commission, "[Why is
it that the same [flederal law appears to produce effective fishery
management results in some areas and not in others?"42
Almost every witness to offer public testimony to the Commis-
sion on fisheries management recommended amending the
Magnuson Act in some way. Four major themes emerge from the
testimony. The first theme is to add or strengthen the conserva-
39. Letter from Larry B. Simpson, Executive Director, Gulf States Marine
Fisheries Commission to Admiral James D. Watkins, Chairman, U.S. Commission
on Ocean Policy 1 (Apr. 17, 2002) (on file with author).
40. Id.
41. See CICIN-SAIN & KNECHT, supra note 17, at 78 (criticizing the Act for fail-
ing to follow the then-existing international practice relating to highly migratory
species, omitting policies for interstate or state-federal areas, and neglecting to
clearly state measures for the sustained development of domestic fishery
resources).
42. NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY, supra note 37, at 7.
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tion mandate in the statute. The second theme is that Congress
amend the Magnuson Act to require that fisheries be governed ac-
cording to principles of ecosystem management. The third theme
is to codify existing management practices, especially those relat-
ing to habitat protection and quota regimes, in order to authorize
or mandate their use by federal agencies and the Councils. The
fourth theme, restructuring of the Councils, was given such consid-
eration by both witnesses and Commissioners that it will be ad-
dressed separately in Part III.
A. Add or Strengthen a Conservation Mandate
Sadly, the heart of fisheries management is rebuilding
overfished stocks.
- Julie K. Morris, Member, Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council.43
As a Gulf Council member, Julie K. Morris advocated that the
first step in the management process should be a determination of
stock status and conservation goals for the stock, relying solely on
scientific analysis. 44 She argued that the Council could then con-
sider the alternatives for reducing harvest including economic, so-
cial, and environmental considerations. 45 Morris likened this first
step to the endangered species listing process used by the Florida
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission "which begins with a
peer-reviewed biological status determination, followed by a man-
agement plan developed in the second phase."46
Many in the fishing community are likely to bristle at the sug-
gestion that Council decisions should emulate the endangered spe-
cies listing. However, Morris's suggestion of preparing a biological
status report prior to making harvesting, allocation, or conserva-
tion decisions is actually a close relative to the process envisioned
under the Magnuson Act. The statute recognizes that "[flishery re-
sources are finite but renewable. If placed under sound manage-
43. Julie K. Morris, Former Commissioner of Florida Fish and Wildlife Con-
servation Commission and Current Member of the Gulf of Mexico Marine Fishery
Council, Testimony Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 7, at http://www.
oceancommission.gov/meetings/feb 22 02/morris statement.pdf (Feb. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter Morris Statement].
44. Id. at 8.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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ment before overfishing has caused irreversible effects, the
fisheries can be conserved and maintained so as to provide opti-
mum yields on a continuing basis."47 Rather than waiting until a
fish species has reached the brink of extinction and listing it as
endangered or threatened, the statute contemplates a manage-
ment scheme beginning with a healthy stock that is then managed
on a sustainable basis.
During Commission testimony, however, the debate raged re-
garding the effectiveness, or even existence, of the Magnuson Act's
"conservation mandate."48 The Act was adopted to "take immedi-
ate action to conserve and manage the fishery resources found off
the coasts of the United States,"49 calling for a national program of
conservation and management to prevent overfishing, rebuild
overfished stocks, ensure conservation, and facilitate long-term
protection of essential fish habitat while realizing the potential of
fishery resources. 50
Regarding conservation matters, the statute states in perti-
nent part:
[T]he rules, regulations, conditions, methods, and other mea-
sures (A) which are required to rebuild, restore, or maintain
... any fishery resource and the marine environment; and (B)
which are designed to assure that: (i) a supply of food and
other products may be taken, and that recreational benefits
may be obtained, on a continuing basis; (ii) irreversible or
long-term adverse effects on fishery resources and the marine
environment are avoided; and (iii) there will be a multiplicity
of options available with respect to future uses of these
resources.
5 1
The national standards present a diverse, and sometimes com-
peting, mix of requirements that Councils strive to meet. Do the
Magnuson Act's stated purpose and its national standards serve as
strong enough conservation mandates to maintain healthy stocks
and rebuild struggling ones? Critics of the statute prior to the
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(5) (2000).
48. Hopkins Statement, supra note 1, at 1; Rod Moore, Executive Director,
West Coast Seafood Processors Association, Statement Before the U.S. Commis-
sion on Ocean Policy 7, at http://oceancommission.gov/meetings/unel3 14 02/
moore testimony.pdf (June 13, 2002) [hereinafter Moore Statement].
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (2000).
50. Id. § 1801(a)(6).
51. Id. § 1802(5).
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1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act amendments saw the SFA as a way
to "put the 'C' for 'conservation' back in the Magnuson Act" by ad-
ding essential fish habitat and bycatch provisions. 52 Five years af-
ter the amendments, however, NMFS and the Secretary of
Commerce were faced with over 100 lawsuits from both the envi-
ronmental and fishing sectors, challenging fisheries management
rules. 53 It is no surprise that environmental advocates claim the
statute needs "[niew mandates for the conservation of fish and
shellfish populations, as well as the ecosystems they are parts
of,"54 while commercial fishing proponents argue the existing stat-
utory regime will soon result in "no fishery left to manage. We will
certainly have fish, just not anyone to catch or process them."55
One of the most affirmative conservation mandates in wildlife law
originates in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Section 7 of the
ESA directs federal agencies to ensure that their actions do not
jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or destroy or
adversely modify the critical habitat of listed species.5 6 However,
lessons learned under section 7 show that even with a clear man-
date, statutes are still subject to inadequate implementation by
federal agencies.57
The ESA does not define what constitutes "jeopardy" to an en-
dangered or threatened species, leaving the federal agencies,
NMFS, and the Fish and Wildlife Service, to interpret the stan-
dard.58 Thus,
[Diespite the apparent power the jeopardy standard gives to
federal fish and wildlife officials to effectively halt or demand
modifications to actions that adversely affect listed species
... analysis reveals that the jeopardy standard's reality is a
far cry from its promise .... [Riather, the concept of jeopardy
52. ludicello et al., supra note 23, at 341.
53. Mary Hope Katsouros, Senior Vice President, The H. John Heinz III
Center for Science, Economics, and the Environment, Statement Before the U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy 5, at http://www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/
jan15 16 02/katsouros statement.pdf (Jan. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Katsouros
Statement].
54. Hopkins Statement, supra note 1, at 1.
55. Moore Statement, supra note 48, at 7.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
57. See Kristen M. Fletcher & Sharonne E. O'Shea, Essential Fish Habitat:
Does Calling It Essential Make It So?, 30 ENVTL. L. 51 nn.143-216 (2000) (analyz-
ing implementation under the Endangered Species Act and Essential Fish
Habitat).
58. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2000).
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often amounts to little more than a vague threat employed by
FWS and NMFS to negotiate relatively minor modifications
to federal and non-federal actions. 59
In addition to facing implementation challenges similar to the
ESA, the Magnuson Act's conservation mandate was tempered in
the 1996 SFA amendments by the requirement that conservation
and management measures "minimize adverse economic impacts"
on fishing communities. 60 Thus, Congress mandated that the Sec-
retary of Commerce conduct economic analyses that balance the
obligation to manage fishery resources with the potential adverse
effects on fishing communities and to the extent practicable mini-
mize those adverse effects.6 1 The resulting lawsuits reveal the
tightrope that the Secretary of Commerce and NMFS walk among
science, economics, and conservation.62
A handful of courts have analyzed the Secretary's balancing of
economic and conservation goals and offer a glimpse into the con-
servation mandate that courts assign to the agency. 63 In Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Daley,64 one of the few circuit court
decisions to interpret the economic requirement, the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council (NRDC) filed suit, claiming that NMFS
failed to meet the statutory requirement that "conservation and
management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving,
on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the
59. Daniel J. Rohlf, Jeopardy Under the Endangered Species Act: Playing a
Game Protected Species Can't Win, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 114, 115 (2001). Rohlf ex-
plains that:
[Tihe causes of the jeopardy standard's ineffectiveness are myriad: legal
shortcomings in FWS'[s] and NMFS'[s] interpretation of the jeopardy
standard itself, procedural limitations on how the Services assess jeop-
ardy, and even basic agency misunderstandings of conservation biology.
Together these problems have significantly undermined the ESA's most
basic protection for species facing extinction. However, the silver lining to
the rather grim current state of affairs is that the jeopardy standard's
failings stem principally from administrative interpretations and policies
rather than weaknesses in the statute itself.
Id. at 115.
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8)(B) (2000).
61. See The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2000) (amended
in 1996, expanding the analysis that federal agencies must complete to determine
the effect of their regulations on small businesses).
62. See Fletcher & O'Shea, supra note 57.
63. See Fletcher, supra note 26, for an analysis of cases under both the
Magnuson Act and Regulatory Flexibility Act.
64. 62 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 1999), rev'd, 209 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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United States fishing industry."6 5 In finding for the agency, the
district court noted an inconsistency between two of the national
standards and held that because the agency must "reconcile" the
two provisions without congressional direction on the issue, the
court must give broad deference to the agency "whose task it is to
resolve competing interests which Congress itself inadvertently
did not resolve ....- 66 On appeal, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia rejected the district court's con-
tention that the two standards at issue create competing goals.
Rather, the court concluded: "It is only when two different plans
achieve similar conservation measures that the [Fish and Wildlife]
Service take into consideration adverse economic consequences." 67
In light of the finding that the first priority of the Magnuson Act is
conservation, the court found that the agency's actions were not
reasonable. 68
A legislative solution to the competing interpretations of the
Magnuson Act's conservation provisions is to require fisheries deci-
sions to be based upon the precautionary principle. 69 As described
in testimony, the precautionary principle "is an established ap-
proach that guides managers to err on the side of the resource,
rather than on the side of short-term economic gain."70 In other
words, the lack of full scientific certainty is not a basis for postpon-
ing conservation measures when a serious risk of environmental
damage is present. While this principle is defined and utilized in
international regimes, it has not been specifically applied to U.S.
fisheries management because there is often uncertainty about its
true meaning and how it might be applied. Obviously, different
stakeholders would be willing to accept different levels of risk.
65. Id. at 106 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2000)).
66. Id. at 107-08.
67. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
68. Id. at 747-56.
69. See David Freestone, International Fisheries Law Since Rio: The Contin-
ued Rise of the Precautionary Principle, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT - PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 135 (Alan Boyle &
David Freestone eds., 1999), for a thorough discussion of the precautionary princi-
ple in the fisheries context. See generally Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO
Law: A Procedure-Based Approach to the Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 323 (2002) (discussing the substitution of procedural criteria for the
current-oriented requirements imposed on national legislation by the WTO).
70. John E. Reynolds, III, Chairman, U.S. Marine Mammal Commission, Ad-
dress Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 4, at http://www.oceancommis-
sion.gov/meetings/feb-22-02/reynolds-statement.pdf (Feb. 22, 2002).
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The Commission recognizes the inherent challenge in adding
the precautionary principle to the fisheries management regime.
In a follow-up question to John Reynolds, Chairman of the U.S.
Marine Mammal Commission, who advocated for the use of the
principle to guide the conservation of marine mammals as they are
affected by fishing practices, the Commission bluntly asked "[Hiow
do you convince the public that the 'precautionary principle' is a
useful tool?"71 Reynolds responded that the principle should be
used "in the management of living marine resources in essentially
the same manner as it is used in our daily lives," comparing the
protection of certain values in our lives such as food, clothing, and
shelter for children, to the protection of the marine environment
and its living resources.7 2 He noted that for the public to make an
educated decision regarding the value of marine resources and the
level of risk that the public is willing to accept, managers and
scientists must provide to the public "realistic, accurate assess-
ments of the status of our marine living resources, the nature and
extent of the threats to those resources.., and the short and long-
term costs associated with their loss."73
Another alternative, and one that may be more feasible in
light of the reservations that surround the application of the pre-
cautionary principle, is to rank the SFA standards in order to clar-
ify for the Councils and NMFS which factors should be a priority in
creating and implementing an FMP. Specifying conservation as
the first priority among the SFA standards would certainly
strengthen the concept of a conservation mandate, as well as pro-
vide greater guidance to Councils and NMFS. Interestingly, both
environmental supporters and fisheries representatives advocated
for such a ranking (but not necessarily the same principles ranked
first) to provide greater clarity in the management process.74
71. Letter from John E. Reynolds, III, Chairman, U.S. Marine Mammal Com-
mission, to Admiral James D. Watkins, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Ocean Pol-
icy 5, at http://www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/feb 22 02/answers/reynolds-
response.pdf (Feb. 22, 2002).
72. Id. at 5-6.
73. Id. at 6.
74. See Morris Statement, supra note 43; Moore Statement, supra note 48.
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B. Mandate Ecosystem Management
In short, we've dug our marine ecosystem into a hole.
- Kathy Fletcher, Executive Director, People For Puget
Sound. 75
During Commission public hearings, witnesses have called for
a recommendation from the Commission "on how best to integrate
an ecosystem or sustainable development approach [to further]
ocean policy for the next 30 years."76 While its council system rep-
resents an initial acknowledgment that fisheries management
must be regional in character, Congress has consistently failed to
mandate more than a species-by-species approach in the Mag-
nuson Act.77 The 1996 SFA amended the Magnuson Act to in-
crease the attention paid to habitat by fisheries managers and
other federal agencies through the identification of "essential fish
habitat."78 These provisions represented to many a new mandate
to manage fisheries through habitat protection. In amending the
Magnuson Act, Congress stated that "[Olne of the greatest long-
term threats to the viability of commercial and recreational fisher-
ies is the continuing loss of marine, estuarine, and other aquatic
habitats. Habitat considerations should receive increased atten-
tion for the conservation and management of fishery resources of
the United States."79 While the 1996 essential fish habitat (EFH)
provisions were not the first attempt by Congress to include
habitat in fisheries management, the provisions did require signifi-
cant changes to FMPs including identifying essential fish habitat;
minimizing adverse effects on this habitat caused by fishing; and
identifying other actions that should be considered to encourage
75. Kathy Fletcher, Executive Director, People For Puget Sound, Testimony
Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 2, at http://www.oceancommission.
gov/meetings/junel3 14_02/fletcher testimony.pdf (June 13, 2002).
76. William T. Hogarth, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Testimony Before the U.S. Commission
on Ocean Policy 2, at http://www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/janl5 16 02/ho-
garth-statement.pdf (Jan. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Hogarth Statement].
77. See generally Sharon R. Siegel, Applying the Habitat Conservation Model
to Fisheries Management: A Proposal for a Modified Fisheries Planning Require-
ment, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141 (2000) (analyzing the failure of limited entry
regimes and the need for habitat protection similar to that under the Endangered
Species Act).
78. See Hsu & Wilen, supra note 8, at 806.
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(9) (2000).
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the conservation and enhancement of essential fish habitat.80
Congress requires federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of
Commerce regarding any action that might adversely affect any
essential fish habitat, after which the Secretary recommends con-
servation measures to the agency.8 1 The statute requires the fed-
eral agency to respond to the Secretary and the appropriate
Council(s), providing a description of measures that will be taken
to avoid, mitigate, or offset the impact of the activity on the
habitat.8 2 When a federal agency response fails to account for the
impacts to essential fish habitat, the agency must include an ex-
planation.83 Like NEPA, the review of the activity is often the fi-
nal step. The acting agency may continue to act, even in a way
that harms essential fish habitat, with NMFS's only recourse being
to consult the Secretaries of both agencies for "higher review."
8 4
While including the EFH provisions in the Magnuson
reauthorization was seen as a move away from species-by-species
management to management of prey species, the benthic commu-
nity, and the health of the ecosystem habitat, many of the threats
that were identified in the FMPs remain outside of the Councils'
jurisdiction. Though the offshore oil and gas industry, coastal de-
velopers, and marine transportation industry raised a myriad of
concerns about the effect EFH would have on their ability to re-
main viable, the Councils' authority did not extend to those indus-
tries. Instead, their authority extends only to the regulation and
limits on fishing activities including gear usage, fishing effort and
catch limits, but not including other activities that may adversely
impact habitat such as oil and gas development or dredging.8 5
The statutory definition of essential fish habitat and the iden-
tification process also hamper the EFH provisions. Congress de-
fined essential fish habitat as those "waters and substrate
80. Id. § 1855(b)(1)(A) (2000). For an analysis of EFH and its predecessor pro-
visions in the 1986 and 1990 Magnuson Act amendments, see Fletcher & O'Shea,
supra note 57.
81. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1855(b)(2), (4)(A) (noting that actions triggering this require-
ment are those authorized, funded, or undertaken, or proposed to be authorized,
funded, or undertaken by the federal agency).
82. Id. § 1855(b)(4)(B).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 1855(b)(1)(C).
85. See also Fletcher & O'Shea, supra note 57, at 65-68 (further discussing
Council authority to regulate and limit fishing activities, but not other activities
that may adversely impact habitat).
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necessary to fish for spawning, breeding, feeding, or growth to ma-
turity."8 6 The Councils took on the challenge of reviewing scien-
tific information and data and establishing just which habitat in
each region was "essential" to managed fish stocks.8 7 However,
with such a broad definition and gaps in available research, the
result of the EFH amendments was to effectively include the U.S.
EEZ as essential fish habitat. NMFS created the "habitat area of
particular concern" (HAPC), describing it as "EFH that is judged to
be particularly important to the long-term productivity of popula-
tions of one or more managed species, or to be particularly vulnera-
ble to degradation" in order to "help provide additional focus for
conservation efforts."88
The vast charge to identify essential fish habitat proved to be
difficult because of the broad definition created by Congress and
the NMFS guidance standards. The guidance document identified
the "basic" information needed for identification of essential fish
habitat. Recognizing that from the broadest perspective, fish hab-
itat is the geographic area where the species occurs at any time
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(10) (2000); see also NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., TECH-
NICAL GUIDANCE TO IMPLEMENT THE ESSENTIAL FISH HABITAT REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS ACT, at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/habitat/efh/Technical
GuidancetoImplementtheEFHRequirementsfortheMagnuson-StevensAct.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2003) [hereinafter NMFS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT] (elaborating
on the definition of essential fish habitat); 50 C.F.R. § 600.10 ("For the purpose of
interpreting the definition of essential fish habitat: 'Waters' includes aquatic areas
and their associated physical, chemical, and biological properties that are used by
fish, and may include areas historically used by fish where appropriate; 'substrate'
includes sediment, hard bottom, structures underlying the waters, and associated
biological communities; 'necessary' means the habitat required to support a sus-
tainable fishery and the managed species' contribution to a healthy ecosystem; and
'spawning, breeding, feeding, or growth to maturity' covers a species' full life
cycle.").
87. For example, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council wrote the
EFH document as amendments to the Groundfish Fishery of the Bering Sea and
Aleutian Islands Area and Gulf of Alaska, the King and Tanner Crab Fisheries in
the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands, the Scallop Fisheries off Alaska, and the Salmon
Fisheries in the EEZ off the Coast of Alaska. N. PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL,
ESSENTIAL FISH HABITAT (1998) (Draft of Environmental Assessment for Secreta-
rial Review for Amendment 55 to the FMP for the Groundfish Fishery of the Ber-
ing Sea and Aleutian Islands Area, Amendment 55 to the FMP for Groundfish of
the Gulf of Alaska, Amendment 8 to the FMP for the King and Tanner Crab Fish-
eries in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands, Amendment 5 to the FMP for Scallop
Fisheries off Alaska, and Amendment 5 to the FMP for the Salmon Fisheries in the
EEZ off the Coast of Alaska).
88. 62 Fed. Reg. 66,531 (Dec. 19, 1997).
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during its life, Councils were responsible for ascertaining informa-
tion on current and historic stock size, geographic range, temporal
and space distribution, and each major life history stage within all
habitats occupied by the managed species. s9 As a result, essential
fish habitat is a multi-dimensional concept. Habitat can be identi-
fied for a specific species in a certain geographic area, in a particu-
lar level of the water column, and during a certain time of year or
season. 90
The EFH provisions are a step toward mandating ecosystem
management under the Magnuson Act, but do not allow for enough
accountability on the part of other federal agencies. A recommen-
dation was made to the Commission to elevate NMFS's and the
Councils' authority,
[requiring] federal agencies to bear the burden of proving
that activities that affect the coastal environment will not
have an adverse impact on fisheries habitat and increasing
NMFS'[s], as well as the [Councils'] ability to veto federal
non-fishing related activities that are found to cause unac-
ceptable adverse impacts to fisheries habitat.91
Increased authority, however, must be combined with a man-
date in the Magnuson Act to develop "Fishery Ecosystem Plans for
major ecosystems and ensure that management action is consis-
tent with these plans."92 Congress mandated similar ecosystem
management in the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). 93 In
its initial findings, Congress noted that "such species and popula-
tion stocks [of marine mammals] should not be permitted to dimin-
89. See 50 C.F.R. § 600.810(a)(2)(B) (2001); see also GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY
MGMT. COUNCIL, GENERIC AMENDMENT FOR ADDRESSING ESSENTIAL FISH HABITAT
REQUIREMENTS IN THE FOLLOWING FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLANS OF THE GULF OF
MEXICO: SHRIMP FISHERY OF THE GULF OF MEXICO, UNITED STATES WATERS; RED
DRUM FISHERY OF THE GULF OF MEXICO; REEF FISH FISHERY OF THE GULF OF MEX-
ICO; COASTAL MIGRATORY PELAGIC RESOURCES (MACKERELS) IN THE GULF OF MEX-
ICO AND SOUTH ATLANTIC; STONE CRAB FISHERY OF THE GULF OF MEXICO; SPINY
LOBSTER IN THE GULF OF MEXICO AND SOUTH ATLANTIC; CORAL AND CORAL REEFS
OF THE GULF OF MEXICO 24, at http://www.gsmfc.org/pubs/Habitat/efh.pdf (Oct.
1998) (documenting the challenges facing the Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Manage-
ment Council in its management of over 450 species of fish).
90. See 50 C.F.R. § 600.815(a)(1)(iii)(A)(1)-(4) (2002).
91. Letter from Cynthia M. Sarthou, Executive Director, Gulf Restoration
Network, to Admiral James D. Watkins, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Ocean
Policy 2 (May 8, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sarthou Answer].
92. Id.
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2) (2000).
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ish beyond the point at which they cease to be a significant
functioning element of the ecosystem of which they are a part" and
should not diminish below their "optimum sustainable popula-
tion."94 The statute defines optimum sustainable population as
the "number of animals which will result in the maximum produc-
tivity of the population or the species, keeping in mind the carrying
capacity of the habitat and the health of the ecosystem."95 Fur-
thermore, Congress enacted the MMPA with the "primary objec-
tive of their management ... [being] to maintain the health and
stability of the marine ecosystem."96
Thus, along with forbidding the "taking"97 or importation of
marine mammals in the United States, the statute sets ecosystem
management as a priority for marine mammal management. 98
While fisheries management is based on the sustainable develop-
ment of the resources and the MMPA is based on the protection,
but generally not the harvest of marine mammals, the statute's
mandate of measuring the health of populations by the health of
the ecosystem can serve as a model for a reauthorization of the
Magnuson Act.
A second element of the MMPA that can serve as a guiding
principle for the Magnuson Act is placing the burden of proving the
compatibility of an activity with the ecosystem on those seeking to
utilize a resource. The MMPA provides for explicit exemptions to
the moratorium on "taking" marine mammals for certain activities,
but requires that other activities apply for a permit or an exemp-
tion from the statute.99 Under an ecosystem management regime
for fisheries, NMFS and the Councils could exempt certain fishing
activities from the statute, while requiring more damaging fishing
activities and federal activities that significantly affect the health
of fisheries' ecosystems to show that they qualify for a permit. This
94. Id.
95. Id. § 1362(9).
96. Id. § 1361(6).
97. Id. § 1371(a). Under the statute, "take" means "to harass, hunt, capture,
or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture or kill any marine mammal." Id.
§ 1362(13).
98. Id. § 1361(6).
99. Permits are available for scientific research, public display, photography,
enhancing the survival or recovery of a species, and some types of commercial fish-
ing. See id. § 1371(a)(1). Exceptions to the statute are available for actions taken
in defense of life or property, id. § 1371(c), and subsistence harvesting, id.
§ 1371(b)(1).
114 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:93
is one option to address land-based activities such as urban and
agricultural runoff, 100 and might force federal agencies to alter pol-
icies in coastal zone development, marine transportation, flood in-
surance, and other programs that drive coastal habitat
destruction.' 0
C. Codify Habitat and Nontraditional Governance Regime
The USA spends several billion dollars per year to manage
National Parks and National Forests. Costs for designating
and managing comparable [MPAs] will be much lower ....
- Dr. Elliott A. Norse, President, Marine Conservation
Biology Institute. 0 2
The third theme in the recommendations regarding the Mag-
nuson Act amendments was to institutionalize certain tools that
are already being used in fisheries management, such as the use of
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and nontraditional governance re-
gimes to allocate rights and resources among user groups. Coun-
cils have been using "no-take zones" or temporary closures of areas
for years and are now faced with a growing demand to establish
areas that preclude all or some fishing activity in order to allow a
fish species to recover.10 3
This demand was illustrated in 1999 when President Clinton
issued Executive Order 13,158 calling for a national coordinated
system of MPAs, defined as "any area of the marine environment
reserved by Federal, State, territorial, tribal or local laws or regu-
lations to provide lasting protection for part or all of the natural
and cultural resources therein."10 4  The Order sought to
strengthen the management and protection of existing MPAs, es-
tablish new or expanded MPAs, develop a national system, and
compel federal agencies to seek consultation regarding MPAs. 105
100. Fletcher, supra note 26, at 3.
101. The Congress and the Administration must also identify needed changes
in federal policy, such as flood insurance, transportation, and the like, that drive
coastal habitat destruction. Sarthou Answer, supra note 91, at 1.
102. Elliot A. Norse, Ph.D., President, Marine Conservation Biology Institute,
Testimony Before the Commission on Ocean Policy Concerning Habitat and Living
Resources 5, at http://www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/aprl8-l9_02/norse_
statement.pdf (Apr. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Norse Statement].
103. See, e.g., South Atlantic Fishery Management Council; Public Meetings,
63 Fed. Reg. 64,244 (Nov. 19, 1998).
104. Executive Order No. 13,158, 65 Fed. Reg. 34,909, 34,909 (May 31, 2002).
105. Id.
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Specifically, the Order compelled each federal agency whose ac-
tions "affect the natural or cultural resources that are protected by
an MPA" to identify those actions and avoid harm to the re-
sources.10 6 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA) has undertaken the effort of cataloguing the existence
and use of MPAs across the country in order to create "an inven-
tory of existing U.S. marine managed areas (MPAs)." 10 7
Despite the order and the popularity of MPAs with some
stakeholders, the Commission testimony showed the extent of dis-
agreement about the soundness and fairness of MPAs. In testi-
mony regarding the effectiveness of MPAs around the world, it was
stated that "population density of fish is on average 91 percent
higher than outside reserves; biomass - or total living matter in
the areas - is 192 percent higher; average size of fish and other
organisms is 31 percent higher; and species diversity is 21 percent
higher." 08 Others see the use of MPAs, or "marine wilderness ar-
eas," as "politically expedient solutions" including "ocean wilder-
ness proposals that severely restrict or eliminate public access to
these national resources."10 9 Many questions remain about the ef-
fectiveness of MPAs and whether or not they merely distribute the
fish to a particular location or actually boost productivity within
the fishery. However, in the Gulf region the "use of MPAs .. .is
probably one of the most common types of fishery regulations uti-
lized by the states and [Gulf] Council" with almost 135,000 square
nautical miles established as MPAs or reserves. 110
While the Magnuson Act is silent on the use of MPAs, they are
common in practice and Congressional language regarding their
106. 65 Fed. Reg. at 34,910.
107. Id. at 34,909. For access to the inventory and other information on marine
managed areas, see Marine Protected Areas of the United States, The MPA Inven-
tory, at http://mpa.gov/mpaservices/mpa-inventory.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2003).
108. David White, Director, The Ocean Conservancy Southeastern Regional Of-
rice, Testimony Before the President's Commission on Ocean Policy 2, at http://
www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/feb_22-02/whitestatement.pdf (Feb. 22,
2002) (citing ROBERT WARNER ET AL., ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS).
109. Michael Nussman, President, American Sportfishing Association, Address
Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 3, at http://www.oceancommission.
gov/meetings/novl3_14 01/nussman_testimony.pdf (Nov. 13, 2001).
110. Letter from Wayne Swingle, Executive Director, Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council, to Admiral James Watkins, Chairman, U.S. Commission on
Ocean" Policy 2, at http://www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/mar7_8_02/answers/
swingle answers.pdf (Mar. 7, 2002).
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use and the development in the fishery context could provide
greater guidance on the level of effectiveness that should be ex-
pected, and the methodology that should be employed to determine
when and where MPAs would be justified. Institutionalizing
MPAs as tools in the fisheries management scheme would clarify
their use by the Councils and NMFS, thereby promoting the
ecosystem and multi-species management discussed above. Any
codification should necessarily give the authority to NMFS to de-
termine the appropriateness of MPAs in particular areas and in
relation to specific species.
Another habitat tool worthy of codification is the "habitat area
of particular concern" (HAPC), included by NMFS in its guidance
to Councils regarding the identification and implementation of
EFH provisions."1 As mentioned above, the HAPC was created to
rein in the broad definition of essential fish habitat and the result-
ing massive inclusion of most of the EEZ as essential fish habitat.
The problem with naming the bulk of the EEZ essential fish
habitat is that the agency's limited resources cannot provide ade-
quate protection to the entire EEZ. The HAPC allows agency and
Council attention to focus on areas of complex habitat, breeding or
feeding areas for overfished stocks, or areas of interaction with
other species, rather than on the entire EEZ in the particular re-
gions. 112 The use of the HAPC is not new and is seen by some as
"the next logical step in protecting EFH."" 3 In 1984, the HAPC
was used by the Gulf and South Atlantic Councils to "protect pris-
tine coral areas from the impacts of gear fished on the bottom...
totaling 390 square miles." 1 4 Codifying the HAPC can provide
greater authority to NMFS to manage these areas as priority es-
sential fish habitat and weave HAPCs into a broader ecosystem
management scheme.
111. NMFS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 86, at 56.
112. See Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Essential Fish Habitat (EFH), 67
Fed. Reg. 2,343, 2,344 (Jan. 17, 2002) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600).
113. Wayne Swingle, Executive Director, Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management
Council, Testimony Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 30, at http://www.
oceancommission.gov/meetings/mar7_8-02/answers/swingle-answers.pdf (Mar. 7,
2002) [hereinafter Swingle Statement].
114. See id. (also stating the Gulf and South Atlantic Councils closed shrimp
nursery grounds, subsequently prohibited all fishing in spawning aggregation
sites for mutton snapper, and proposed the establishment of two marine reserves
at gag grouper spawning aggregation sites).
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Another area of fishery management that would benefit from
statutory amendment is the inclusion of nontraditional governance
regimes that can assist Councils and NMFS in allocating finite re-
sources to numerous stakeholders. While Individual Fishing Quo-
tas (IFQs) and Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) are
currently in use in some U.S. fisheries, the 1996 SFA placed a mor-
atorium on the development of new IFQ or ITQ systems. 115
With fisheries management schemes becoming more and more
restrictive and some fisheries closing, many in the fishing commu-
nity and government began advocating for the expansion of trad-
able permitting. 116 An ITQ scheme creates permits that grant the
right to fish a certain percentage of the total allowable catch for a
fishery. 1 7 Along with the moratorium created by the SFA, Con-
gress mandated a National Academy of Sciences review and report
for recommendations on implementing a national policy for
IFQs. 1 8 In 1999, the National Research Council issued the report,
recommending the use of ITQs as one legitimate option among
many; Councils should make the determination of whether to use
an ITQ system on a case-by-case basis. 119
Commission testimony explained the need for a national deci-
sion on IFQs and ITQs: "[Tihe fishing industry needs to know
whether or not IFQs and ITQs will be used as a tool of manage-
115. See 16 U.S.C. § 1853(d)(1)(A) (2000) ("A Council may not submit and the
Secretary may not approve or implement before October 1, 2000, any fishery man-
agement plan, plan amendment, or regulation under this chapter which creates a
new individual fishing quota program.").
116. See generally Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmen-
tal Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 396
(1999) (analyzing fishing quotas).
117. Carrie A. Tipton, Protecting Tomorrow's Harvest: Developing a National
System of Individual Transferable Quotas to Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 381, 397 (1995).
118. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(d)(5) (2000).
119. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 21, at 194. The 1996 SFA halted the devel-
opment of the ITQ system for the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery, leaving the
Gulf Council scrambling to adopt an emergency endorsement system in order to
keep the commercial fishery open. See 16 U.S.C. § 1883(b); see also Kristen M.
Fletcher, 18:3 WATER LOG 6, Red Snapper Fishery Tests License Limitation System
(1998), at http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/waterlog.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2003). The restriction did not apply to the North Pacific halibut and sablefish,
South Atlantic wreckfish, or the Mid-Atlantic surfclam and ocean (including ma-
hogany) quahog individual fishing quota programs. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(d)(2)(B)
(2000).
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ment and what the rules governing their use will be."120 Similar to
the National Research Council findings, most witnesses recognized
that while such programs are not effective systems for every fish-
ery, Magnuson amendments "should allow each [Clouncil to deter-
mine whether to implement such a system."121
While these quota programs have received much attention,
they are not the only governance regimes in existence. In fact,
"fisheries cooperatives and community-based management sys-
tems, bound to adhere to stringent federal standards, may prove
more effective than the current system that relies so heavily on the
regional fishery management councils."' 22 Recognizing that the
current use of open access and, at times, limited entry can create
incentives for overfishing, overcapitalization and derby fishing, the
Commission was urged to consider these alternative regimes to al-
low for tailored responses to fisheries, their stakeholders, and fluc-
tuations in effort and catch. 123
IV. RESTRUCTURING THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCILS
Ask yourself whether you would be willing to fly in a com-
mercial airliner designed by engineers with the same record of
success as our fishery management councils.
- Dr. Elliott A. Norse, President, Marine Conservation
Biology Institute. 12 4
Whether an environmental representative suggests the altera-
tion of the membership of the Councils or a scientist recommends
the modification of their function, one of the themes that arises in
120. David T. Goethel, Ocean Policy and Fisheries: A Discussion of Areas in
Need of Change, Address Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 2, at http:/!
www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/ju123 24 02/goethel-testimony.pdf (July 23,
2002) [hereinafter Goethel Statement].
121. Swingle Statement, supra note 113, at 3. Swingle states:
[Liarge segments of the constituency of some Councils oppose the concept
.... Some of the constituent opposition is due to the fact the ITQs create
a windfall profit for the persons who first sell the ITQ certificates. This
could be eliminated by using language to allow the federal government to
collect this windfall profit, as did the state of Florida for spiny lobster and
stone crab trap certificate programs.
Id.; see also Morris Statement, supra note 43, at 7 (echoing Swingle's hopes that
the "Commission would support changes in federal law that would allow each Fish-
ery Council to determine whether ITQs would be a useful tool for their fisheries.").
122. Hopkins Statement, supra note 1, at 2.
123. Id. at 2; see also Morris Statement, supra note 43.
124. Norse Statement, supra note 102, at 5.
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almost every fisheries-related testimony to the Commission is to
somehow "improve" the Councils.
The Magnuson Act created eight regional management coun-
cils, 125 stating that each should "reflect the expertise and interest
of the several constituent States in the ocean area over which such
Council is granted authority."126 The Councils are responsible for
preparing FMPs and amending them when necessary, preparing
comments on applications for foreign fishing, and conducting pub-
lic hearings.1 27 The Councils rely on analysis and information
from various advisory committees including a fishing industry ad-
visory committee, a scientific and statistical committee, and spe-
cies working groups. The committees assist in the "development,
collection, and evaluation of such statistical, biological, economic,
social and other scientific information as is relevant to .. . [the]
development and amendment of any fishery management plan."128
Membership on the Councils consists of the following voting
members: the principal state official with marine fishery manage-
ment responsibility, 29 the NMFS regional director for the geo-
graphic area concerned, 130 individuals appointed by the Secretary
of Commerce who "are knowledgeable regarding the conservation
and management, or the commercial and recreational harvest, of
the fishery resources," 13' and members "from a list of qualified in-
dividuals submitted by the Governor of each constituent State."' 32
Nonvoting members include the Fish and Wildlife Service regional
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a) (2000).
126. Id. § 1852. The eight Regional Fishery Management Councils and the
"constituent States" are: New England (consisting of Maine, New Hampshire, Mas-
sachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut), Mid-Atlantic (consisting of New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina),
South Atlantic (consisting of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Flor-
ida), Caribbean (consisting of Virgin Islands and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico), Gulf of Mexico (consisting of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Texas), Pacific (consisting of California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho), North
Pacific (consisting of Alaska, Washington, and Oregon), and Western Pacific (con-
sisting of Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands).
Id. § 1852(a)(1)(A)-(H).
127. Id. § 1852(h).
128. Id. § 1852(g)(1). Councils may create additional advisory committees as
deemed necessary. Id. § 1852(g)(2).
129. Id. § 1852(b)(1)(A).
130. Id. § 1852(b)(1)(B).
131. Id. § 1852(b)(2)(A).
132. Id. § 1852(b)(2)(C).
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or area director, the Coast Guard District Commander, the Marine
Fisheries Commission Executive Director, and one representative
from the Department of State.133 The statute requires that voting
members disclose financial interest in "any harvesting, processing,
or marketing activity . . . undertaken within any fishery over
which the Council ... has jurisdiction."134
While a wide variety of suggestions were given to the Commis-
sion during public hearings, three main themes for restructuring
the Council emerged. The first was revising Council membership
to reduce the economic conflicts of interest inherent in managing a
resource in which a member has a financial interest. The second
theme was amending the Councils' authority to either increase or
decrease NMFS's overall role, while the third theme was adding
accountability for the Councils if stocks are overfished or Council
measures fail to rebuild a stock in the allotted time-period.
A. Revising Council Membership
One of the greatest criticisms of the Councils from the Com-
mission testimony is the perceived disproportional makeup and po-
tential conflicts of interest for Council members. Even though the
Magnuson Act "was amended in 1990 to tighten Council member-
ship qualifications . . . [a] general perception exists that decisions
are made primarily by those who represent the industry and thus
have a direct financial interest in the outcome." 135
The Magnuson Act directs that commercial fishers and others
that are economically dependent on fishing be represented on the
Councils. 13 6 The perceived threat is that "in doing so, the [Mag-
nuson Act] has put the fox in charge of the henhouse." 137 The orig-
inal statute contemplated, without directly addressing the poten-
tial conflicts of interest, that the representation of the commercial
133. Id. § 1852(c). The Pacific Council has an additional nonvoting member ap-
pointed by the Governor of Alaska. Id. § 1852(c)(2).
134. Id. § 1852(j)(2)(C).
135. Lawrence Watters, A Pacific Coast Perspective on Policy and Legal Issues
Related to Reauthorization of the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Manage-
ment Act, 9 TUL. ENWVTL. L.J. 287, 291 (1996).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(4) (2000).
137. Letter from Doug Hopkins, Program Director, Oceans Program, Environ-
mental Defense, to the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 5, at http://www.ocean
commission.gov/meetings/novl3-14-01/answers/Hopkins-answers.pdf (Nov. 13,
2001) [hereinafter Hopkins Answer].
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and recreational fishing interests on the Councils be based on the
number of fishers, vessels, shore-support employees, and the eco-
nomic contribution of the various fisheries to the different re-
gions. 138 It is the "dismissal" of the importance of potential
economic conflicts of interest that has led to the greatest criticism.
It leaves Council members in the position of having to make "a
range of scientific determinations that affect [Clouncil members'
short-term economic interests, but that also affect the public's long
term interests in sustainable fisheries and healthy marine
ecosystems." 139
Along with prohibiting the membership of those with economic
interests in the outcome of Council decisions, witnesses recom-
mended restricting Council membership to scientists and wildlife
managers who can best make decisions based on the scientific
needs of the species and ecosystem. Elliott Norse of the Marine
Conservation Biology Institute recommended that "membership
and staffing should be reconstituted to include a majority with de-
monstrable expertise in marine conservation and management,
who work for academic institutions and public interest nonprofit
organizations .... ,,140 He also advocated for a Federal Fisheries
Management Commission comprised of "individuals knowledgea-
ble in the fields of marine ecology and resource management" 141
who would provide independent oversight of NMFS and the
Councils.
Many models exist to reduce or remove the economic conflicts
of interest in Council membership. The Magnuson Act was am-
ended to require financial disclosure statements. 42 However,
Congress can add further specifications regarding conflicts if such
disclosures do not prevent taking actions that are in the best inter-
est of the industry, but not of the resource. For example, Congress
may require adding more public accountability to the Council pro-
cess, potentially reducing the number of conflicts of interest, or
Congress may require appointed members to be independent of
current fishing activities (i.e., familiar with the commercial fishing
138. H.R. REP. No. 94-445, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 631.
139. Hopkins Answer, supra note 137, at 5.
140. Norse Statement, supra note 102, at 4.
141. Id.
142. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(j)(2)(A)-(C) (2000).
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sector, but not dependent upon it for economic reasons). 143 The
statute can take one of three tactics: prevent membership by those
with a conflict of interest, limit the discretion of those with a con-
flict of interest, or institute penalties for violation of the conflict of
interest when it dictates a reckless resource decision. 14
B. Amend Council Authority and Accountability
Altering the membership of Councils to avoid conflicts of inter-
est naturally leads to a discussion of the options for limiting the
discretion or authority of Councils. Rather than provide Councils
with unlimited authority in the creation of FMPs and designation
of total allowable catch amounts, some witnesses advocated grant-
ing the Councils allocation authority only. 145 In such a model,
NMFS would be responsible for setting the total allowable catch,
but the Councils would then determine how to allocate the availa-
ble fish among competing economic interests. By placing the catch
determination in the hands of NMFS, it is argued that catch levels
will not be set too high, as may be the case when Councils adopt
catch limits.146 Limiting Councils to such an "advisory role only,"
would still allow for them to advise NMFS of other related issues
such as how to "spread out fishing effort geographically and over
time to minimize the potential for derby fisheries, minimize the
net economic cost of FMP restrictions, enhance safety, increase ef-
ficiency, and reduce the costs of monitoring and enforcement."' 47
Witnesses suggested that if Councils maintain their current
role of setting catch limits and making determinations regarding
overfished stocks and rebuilding plans, then they should be made
more accountable for failures such as failing to rebuild a stock. A
system of penalties could be established denying the Council au-
thority over specific stocks or abolishing the Council until NMFS
143. See Kevin R. Murray et al., Natural Resource Damage Trustees: Whose
Side Are They Really On?, 5 ENvTL. LAW. 407 (1999), for an example of amending
the requirements for natural resource damage trustees to mirror federal bank-
ruptcy trustees.
144. See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physi-
cian Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. &
MED. 241 (1995), for an interesting discussion of points of intervention and major
policy approaches in the health care field as they relate to conflicts of interest.
145. Hopkins Answer, supra note 137, at 6.
146. Id. at 5.
147. Id. at 6.
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can rebuild stocks and/or reestablish a Council that can meet the
statute's requirements. While NMFS and the Secretary of Com-
merce have much greater control over Council activities than these
suggestions imply, the reality is that Council decisions are rarely
overruled.
Despite strong feelings that the Council structure needs
amending, others in the process felt equally as strong that the
"character of our fisheries can only be maintained through local
governance [of the Councils] and the complex problems we face will
be addressed most effectively by using the knowledge and informa-
tion of fishermen who have chosen to participate in the process."148
The creation of the Council-based management regime is one of the
fundamental elements of the Magnuson Act and will likely not be
abolished or altered significantly. A compromise position for the
Commission may be to address conflicts of interest more fully by
statute and recommend the regular review of Council membership
to avoid inequities.
V. FEDERAL AGENCY ORGANIZATION AND RESEARCH
In your group's opinion, what are the most critical changes
needed at the federal level to address the major environmental
problems in the Gulf of Mexico?
- Follow-up question from Admiral Watkins. 149
The most fundamental change needed at the federal level is a
move away from the current crisis-oriented management ap-
proach toward decision-making that is coordinated among the
various federal agencies, is adaptive and is comprehensive.
- Answer from Cynthia M. Sarthou, Executive Director,
Gulf Restoration Network.150
A. Reforming the Federal Ocean Approach
The 1969 Stratton Commission Report recommended the crea-
tion of an independent ocean agency to coordinate marine-related
148. Thomas R. Hill, Chairman, New England Fishery Management Council,
Testimony Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 3, at http://www.ocean
commission.gov/meetings/jul23_24_02/hill testimony.pdf (July 23, 2002).
149. Sarthou Answer, supra note 91, at 1.
150. Id.
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activities.' 5 ' This recommendation led Congress to create NOAA,
but rather than make it a cabinet-level, independent agency, Con-
gress placed NOAA in the Department of Commerce (DOC), noted
as a "department historically focused more on promoting business
and trade than advancing science and conservation." 152 Placement
in the DOC, combined with the abundance of environmental laws
and regulations that were adopted in the 1970s and 1980s, caused
management of the oceans and marine resources to be splintered
among many federal agencies "each of which has its own mandate
and often lacks adequate resources to accomplish critical tasks."153
When considering reform of the federal agency structure, the Com-
mission must consider the type of management necessary (i.e.,
ecosystem-based versus species-by-species), the effects on marine
resources from both marine and non-marine activities, the author-
ity necessary to alter these activities, and the nature of the crisis
facing ocean management. While "the existing structure has
proven inadequate to cope with the crises facing our oceans, let
alone to implement an ecosystem-based management ap-
proach,"' 54 a cabinet-level agency has been recommended to coor-
dinate among federal agencies and to implement a sustainable
management scheme for marine resources.' 55
The existing structure is composed of a three-way division of
jurisdiction along with fragmented agencies who manage their own
interests in the oceans based on a single-purpose approach.' 56 The
federal, state, and local governments all have some level of govern-
ance authority in the coasts that affect the way resources are man-
aged or protected.
The cabinet-level departments with various interests in ocean
and coastal resources include the Department of Commerce:
NOAA/NMFS, National Ocean Service, Coastal Zone Management
Program, and the Sea Grant College Program; the Department of
151. NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., COMM'N ON MARINE Sci., ENG'G &
RES., OUR NATION AND THE SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION 4 (Jan. 1969), avail-
able at http://www.lib.noaa.gov/edocs/stratton/chapterl.html#Plan (last visited
Feb. 22, 2003).
152. Roger T. Rufe, President, The Ocean Conservancy, Statement Before the
U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 3, at http://www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/
nov13 14 01/rufe testimony.pdf (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Rufe Statement].
153. Id.
154. Id. at 4.
155. Id.
156. CICIN-SAIN & KNECHT, supra note 17, at 19-20.
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Interior: Minerals Management Service, U.S. Geologic Survey and
the Environmental Protection Agency; the Department of Defense:
Navy and Army Corps of Engineers; and the Department of Trans-
portation: Coast Guard and Maritime Administration. With the
newly created Department of Homeland Security, which will likely
house the Coast Guard, the degree of fractionalization in the fed-
eral scheme becomes clear. 15 7 Without a "mechanism in the Exec-
utive Branch to establish a government-wide policy for the oceans,"
the departments operate as independent agencies, without the re-
sponsibility or authority to "develop or administer an integrated
management program." 158 As a result, national ocean policy is de-
pendent upon each agency's individual policy goals.
Currently, NMFS and the Secretary of the Interior have pri-
mary responsibility over fisheries management, but have little lev-
erage to prevent activities in the ocean that affect the health of
fisheries. One example of this lack of leverage is the land-based
alterations affecting the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf Region has lost
approximately fifty percent of its historical wetlands and has been
greatly affected by activities on the rivers that feed into it, provid-
ing freshwater and nutrient support for Gulf fisheries. 159 Struc-
tural projects for flood control and navigation, runoff from
agricultural sites hundreds of miles away, and urban development
are responsible for greater nonpoint source pollution, leaving the
Gulf of Mexico long on pollutants and short on the natural sedi-
ments that have been carried through the nation's rivers for
centuries.160
As mentioned previously, the Magnuson Act requires federal
agencies to consult with NMFS regarding actions that will affect
essential fish habitat. While this is an attempt to integrate the
interest of fishery resources with decisions of other agencies,
NMFS's only recourse against agencies that disagree with its find-
ings is to request review by the Secretaries of both NMFS and the
acting agency.
157. Id. at 20-21.
158. Id. at 22.
159. Cynthia Sarthou, Executive Director, Gulf Restoration Network, Testi-
mony Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 7, at http://www.oceancommis-
sion.gov/meetings/mar7_8_02/sarthou-statement.pdf (Mar. 7, 2002) [hereinafter
Sarthou Statement].
160. Id.
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Relying on the original recommendation by the Stratton Com-
mission, many witnesses recommended the creation of a cabinet-
level Department of the Oceans. 161 Though not a new idea, the
current climate of integrated management of land-based resources
may pave the way for such a "super-agency." The increasing popu-
larity of ecosystem management and watershed management dur-
ing the 1990s has led to the increased use of integrated, sustained
management regimes. However, the debate remains whether an
"Oceans Agency" can overcome the fragmented governance regime
that has been in use for three decades and is based on statutes
adopted during a time when the nation sought to develop un-
derutilized resources, instead of safeguarding resources and eco-
systems. The success of such an agency may depend upon the
enactment of legislation calling for a national policy and integra-
tion of authority and mandate.
Not all suggestions included such a drastic change to the fed-
eral structure. One witness suggested, "[As] an interim step to es-
tablishing an independent agency, I urge you to recommend
creating a permanent, cabinet-level interagency oceans advisory
council."1 62 Others believe the current structure is workable. In a
follow-up question by the Commission to a member of the Gulf
Council, it was asked whether establishing a Council like the
Marine Mammal Commission which oversees marine mammal is-
sues for NOAA, would "help solve fishery management
problems." 163 Gulf Council Member Julie K. Morris did not see the
value in adding a commission that would provide advisory infor-
mation to Congress, the Council and NOAA, explaining that the
[Clouncils already have stock assessment panels and stand-
ing scientific and statistical committees with expertise in the
regional fish stocks. [There is no] advantage of having a na-
tional commission also reviewing the science of regional fish-
eries, and instead see an additional forum for scientific
161. See, e.g., Norse Statement, supra note 102, at 10; Rufe Statement, supra
note 152, at 3; Katsouros Statement, supra note 53, at 4.
162. Rufe Statement, supra note 152, at 4.
163. Letter from Julie K. Morris, Former Commissioner of Florida Fish and
Wildlife Conservation Commission and Current Member of the Gulf of Mexico
Marine Fishery Council, to the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 4, at http://www.
oceancommission.gov/meetings/feb 22-02/answers/morris answers.pdf. (Feb. 22,
2002) (on file with author).
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review as another place for additional decision-making to get
bogged down.
David Goethel, biologist and fisherman, suggested still a dif-
ferent tactic:
[Riequire bureaucrats to spend one week per year observing
the industry they oversee. A few members of various govern-
ment agencies have actually come out with me or other fish-
ermen to get some hands on experience, but always on their
days off. Some of the agencies actually frown on their em-
ployees getting experience by saying it destroys their objec-
tivity. In my opinion, many of our regulatory problems in
ocean policy could be greatly lessened if our overseers had ru-
dimentary knowledge of the problems faced when working in
the ocean environment. You can read about it behind a desk
until hell freezes over, but as my own children found out,
nothing clarifies the mind like an ice-covered deck in the mid-
dle of January. 64
In lieu of mandating days at sea in mid-January for federal
agency employees - for which there might not be enough NOAA
lawyers to handle the potential liability - elevating stewardship of
marine resources to the cabinet level has its advantages. As one
witness recommended: "[Take all the marine components other
than defense and diplomacy and make them work together. We
are a maritime nation; does it not make sense to have an arm of
government that reflects that important fact?"' 65 Likewise, re-
search efforts could be combined to implement a new national
strategy.
B. Advancing Research Capabilities and Priorities
What is known about the dynamics of marine species is gener-
ally based on information gathered after a species is in peril or
a decline in abundance is noted.
- Dr. Gus Rassam, Executive Director, American Fish-
eries Society. 166
The substance of Dr. Rassam's statement was one area upon
which all Commission witnesses agreed. The amount of federal
164. Goethel Statement, supra note 120, at 3.
165. Moore Statement, supra note 48, at 5-6.
166. Dr. Ghassan Rassam, Executive Director, American Fisheries Society, Ad-
dress to the Ocean Policy Commission 2, at http://oceancommission.gov/meetings/
nov13 _14OllRassam testimony.pdf (Nov. 13, 2001).
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spending on marine research, whether the area is fisheries, marine
operations, marine pollution, or other marine species, is sadly out
of proportion compared to research conducted for land or non-
marine resources. Each public meeting of the Commission re-
sulted in a collective call for more federal spending on marine re-
search and education. 167 According to Wayne Swingle, Executive
Director of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, even
though the number of NMFS personnel to gather data on fisheries
was gradually increased after implementation of the Magnuson
Act, level funding for NMFS during the 1980s, when the number of
FMPs was increasing, prevented the number of personnel from
increasing.168
And while funding marine resource research is critical to
proper management, throwing money into the current structure
would be an inadequate fix. Instead, to be of any use to the fisher-
ies regime, additional funding for fisheries research must be ac-
companied by a research agenda, revitalized to acknowledge and
account for the failures in stock assessment, habitat protection,
and overfishing.
As discussed above, NMFS and the Councils are required
under NEPA to assess the impacts of fishing on the environment.
In addition, these entities must determine the optimum yield of a
fishery, the essential fish habitat, and the effect that management
measures will have on fishing communities - all based on the best
scientific information available. Unfortunately, this leaves NMFS
and the Councils leading the fisheries management regime blind,
as the information necessary to make educated decisions is un-
available in a timely manner or is nonexistent. 169 This is best de-
scribed in the following testimony:
167. See, e.g., Carolyn Thoroughgood, Statement Before the U.S. Commission
on Ocean Policy 3, at http://www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/novl3_14_01/
Thoroughgood-testimony.pdf (Nov. 13, 2001); Thomas C. Malone, The Need for a
Regional Approach for Detecting, Understanding, and Predicting Changes in the
Coastal Ocean, Address Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 2-3, at http:l/
www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/ju123_24_02/malonetestimony.pdf (July 23,
2002); Susan Hanna, Economic Investments to Improve Fisheries Management,
Address Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 3-4, at http://www.oceancom-
mission.gov/meetings/june13_14_02/hanna testimony.pdf (June 13, 2002).
168. Swingle Statement, supra note 113, at 1.
169. See Hogarth Statement, supra note 76, at 4 (discussing statistics regard-
ing the "breadth and quality" of NMFS scientific research program).
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When Dr. William Hogarth, National Director of the National
Marine Fisheries Service, was in Gloucester last summer, he
acknowledged being stymied by the inadequate scientific data
available to him in assessing the stocks. The data, he said,
was 2 112 to 3 years old. Couple that weakness with the
widely divergent anecdotal reports of the fisherman. The pic-
ture you end up with suffers from critical gaps, which make
final assessments mere guesswork at best.170
With over 100 lawsuits filed against NMFS in recent years,
scientists are spending valuable time defending their data and
analyses rather than gathering new data.171 As William Hogarth
explained, "science sometimes gives people the answers they don't
want to hear, which can lead to criticism."1 72 Hogarth painted an
optimistic picture of NMFS research efforts in his January 15,
2002 testimony explaining that:
[Clontrary to some of the criticism, NOAA Fisheries main-
tains full service science centers with scientists who in many
cases are world-renowned in their field .... The problem is
not the quality of the science or where it is located, but the
fact that it is under-funded given the demands for data and
analysis.173
Assuming additional money could be made available for
marine research, what priorities should be set for its use? When
asked in a follow-up question about the "science voids in fisheries
management," Hogarth responded: "[Tihere are many gaps in our
scientific knowledge. Many topics will never be completely under-
stood, but we continually strive to improve our knowledge." 7 4
Suggestions to the Commission included three major priori-
ties. First, it was recommended that NMFS study fish stocks when
populations are abundant instead of waiting until after a problem
170. Roger S. Berkowitz, Figuring out the Sustainability of the Fish Industry:
Literally a Life and Death Proposition, Address Before the U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy 2, at http://www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/ju123_24_02/
berkowitz.testimony.pdf (July 23, 2002) [hereinafter Berkowitz Statement].
171. Katsouros Statement, supra note 53, at 5.
172. Hogarth Statement, supra note 76, at 4.
173. Id.
174. Letter from William T. Hogarth, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, to U.S. Commission on Ocean
Policy 3 (Mar. 7, 2002) (on file with author). Hogarth's top four recommendations
for spending on research were data collection, fisheries oceanography, socio-eco-
nomics, and essential fish habitat studies. Id. at 4-5.
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is identified. 175 Delay can force the use of restrictive management
measures to rebuild the depleted population and cause fisherman
to shift their effort to other species, potentially starting another
process of overfishing and depletion. 176 Second, Congress should
mandate the long-term monitoring of the coasts, estuarine waters,
and the EEZ to provide assessments and mapping.177 Lastly, the
timeliness.of the data collection process is imperative and requires
updated scientific equipment on boats and an increased number of
observers in order to compile real-time data. 17s
Marine fisheries research in the United States is not without
its successes. One successful example of redesigning federal re-
search efforts is the creation of state-federal partnerships such as
the Marine Resources Monitoring, Assessment and Prediction Pro-
gram (MARMAP). MARMAP, which provides data to the state
management sections, is a partnership among the South Carolina
Department of Natural Resources, Marine Resources Division,
South Atlantic Council, NMFS, and the Atlantic States Marine
Fisheries Commission. 179 According to George R. Sedberry, Assis-
tant Director of the Marine Resources Research Institute,
MARMAP addresses specific management problems, such as sur-
vival rates of released fish, movements of species, growth rates,
and the status of the fisheries.'8 0 Sedberry also testified regarding
the Southeast Area Monitoring and Assessment Program-South
Atlantic (SEAMAP-SA), another cooperative program with NMFS,
that conducts annual trawl surveys of shallow coastal waters from
Cape Hatteras, North Carolina to Cape Canaveral, Florida.',,
The value of the research results is unparalleled: MARMAP
data has been used to locate areas of reef habitat, to site potential
marine protected areas, and to measure the abundance and diver-
175. Sarthou Statement, supra note 159, at 6.
176. Id.
177. Ken Haddad, Address Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 2, at
http://www.oceancommission.gov/meetingsfeb_22_02/haddadstatement.pdf (Feb.
22, 2002).
178. Berkowitz Statement, supra note 170, at 2.
179. George R. Sedberry, Assistant Director, Marine Resources Research Insti-
tute, Address Before the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 1-2, at http:/l
www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/Janl5-l6-02/sedberry-statement.pdf (Jan.
15, 2002).
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id. at 3.
20021 RECOMMENDATION TO OCEAN COMMISSION 131
sity of species.' 8 2 While Sedberry cautioned against the use of
partnership resources to focus on single-species fisheries in partic-
ular, he urged the use of this state-federal partnership model to
meet the objectives of the Oceans Act.' 8 3
In addition, Wayne Swingle, Executive Director of the Gulf of
Mexico Fishery Management Council, pointed to cooperative pro-
grams for the collection of management information, especially the
innovative way this data collection requirement is being ap-
proached in ' the New England area . . . through cooperative
research plans which involve the fishing industries in collec-
tion of both fishery dependent data (e.g., bycatch) and fishery
independent data (e.g., trawl surveys) to determine year class
strength ofjuveniles. The program makes the fishery partici-
pants more comfortable with the results of stock assessments,
and Congress appears more willing to fund such cooperative
research when supported by commercial and recreational
industries.184
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT "WISH LIST"
The future of fisheries management in this country is depen-
dent upon the timely collection and analysis of scientific data and
the ability of the managers to respond to that data in an efficient
manner, avoiding political and economic conflicts of interest. Pres-
ently, the federal research agenda and the management scheme
mandated under the Magnuson Act hamper, and in some ways,
preclude these results. The Commission was told to "be bold" but
must be aware of the political realities that may preclude a com-
plete overhaul to the system. Based on these political realities,
public testimony to the Commission, and the failures of the man-
agement regime over the last twenty-six years, the "wish list" for
fisheries begins with an evaluation of the federal governmental
structure and authority given to NMFS and the Councils. The
wish list includes a revitalized EEZ research agenda, and con-
cludes with a transformation of the current species-by-species ap-
proach to an ecosystem-based approach.
The Commission should recommend reevaluation of the place-
ment of NOAA and NMFS in the Department of Commerce. The
182. Id. at 3-4.
183. Id. at 4.
184. Swingle Statement, supra note 113, at 2.
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Commission is already contemplating a reorganization at the fed-
eral level in order "to more effectively respond to issues" and pro-
vide a more coordinated approach to marine issues.18 5 The
inability of the Department of Commerce to adapt to ecosystem-
based approaches, especially in the area of marine fisheries, or ad-
equately address the need for marine-related research, strength-
ens the argument for a federal Department of the Oceans. This
department would be a cabinet-level agency with a scientific advi-
sory panel setting the research and technical approaches for fisher-
ies. A cabinet-level agency dedicated to the protection and
sustained use of U.S. oceanic resources can provide greater gui-
dance related to marine issues nationwide and undertake the task
of advocating and finding the funding for necessary marine re-
search, through both congressional funding and public/private
partnerships. The research agenda must be mandated by Con-
gress and assigned to the Oceans Agency and NOAA to implement.
If moved to a federal Oceans Agency with oversight of activi-
ties affecting the oceans, NMFS will likely have greater influence
in the review of land-based activities. With a coordinated planning
and review effort, there is a greater opportunity for the agency to
affect policy changes at the federal level. Likewise, the Magnuson
Act should be amended to mandate stronger accountability by
NMFS to take measures necessary to prevent overfishing and re-
build stocks, based on recommendations from the Councils. While
NMFS currently has the authority to override Council action, it
rarely does so, leaving fisheries management decisions largely in
the hands of a body that "strive[s] to create consensus among large
and diverse groups of stakeholders, and often settle[s] for the low-
est common denominator."1 86
Fisheries management overall should be reexamined and
amended to reflect ecosystem management, similar to the scheme
mandated in the Marine Mammal Protection Act. While the 1996
EFH provisions were a start, the Magnuson Act still fails to ac-
knowledge the importance of ecosystem maintenance and, thus,
fails to provide adequate mechanisms to address fishing down the
185. NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY, supra note 37, at 15.
186. See Hopkins Statement, supra note 1, at 2 ("[Allternative entities may be
able to craft solutions that are successful and durable because the number of
stakeholders may be smaller and more likely to agree on principles and manage-
ment measures.").
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food chain, the capacity of the ecosystem, and those areas that are
truly "essential" habitat. By recognizing the interconnectedness of
species and their habitat, a system of marine protected areas can
be developed, the purpose of which is to provide rebuilding areas
for species; a kind of refuge area that can target necessary ele-
ments of the marine environment.
When adopted in 1976, the authors of the Magnuson Act were
concerned with the development of domestic fisheries, paving the
way for overcapitalization in fisheries that had already been sub-
jected to overfishing by foreign fleets. In the years following its
enactment, the technology of catching fish overtook fisheries sci-
ence, leaving stock assessment and ecosystem analysis behind as
fisheries began to crash in regions across the United States. The
wealth of public testimony provides a road map for the Ocean Com-
mission, and more importantly, for Congress, to reexamine the fed-
eral management structure and our history of fishing in order to
implement vital changes.

